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Indexing  Brazilian  Style. 
Inflation  without  Tears? 
IN  EARLY  1974 the business and popular press let scarcely a week go by 
without some reference to the possibility of indexing bonds, savings ac- 
counts, and even contracts, to the price level. In this way, some argue, the 
corrosive symptoms of inflation can at least be neutralized, even if the 
malady itself cannot be cured. 
The basic principle is not new. The search for an immutable standard 
traces back at least to Jevons;l and Irving Fisher apparently succeeded in 
persuading an American firm to issue an indexed bond in 1925. More re- 
cently, in the 1950s, Finland, France, and Israel, among other countries, 
have resorted to such practices for governmental obligations and savings 
accounts; and Latin American countries have experimented with deposit 
accounts  denominated in  dollars, as  well  as  with  adjustable exchange 
rates.2 
Renewed interest in indexing is a clear consequence of the persistence 
of inflation in the developed countries in recent years. Monetary and fiscal 
policy has been of little avail; and the apparent failure of price and wage 
controls, joined to the cost implications of shortfalls of energy and food 
1. W. Stanley  Jevons,  Money  and the Mechanism  of Exchange  (Appleton, 1898 ed.), 
pp. 318-26. 
2. For a brief discussion  of the history of the idea of indexing  (including  the Fisher 
episode), see David Finch, "Purchasing  Power Guarantees  for Deferred Payments," 
International  Monetary  Fund  Staff Papers,  Vol. 5 (1956-57), pp. 1-22; for more recent 
experience,  see Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development,  Committee 
on Financial  Markets,  Indexation  of Fixed-Interest  Securities  (Paris: OECD, 1973). 
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in 1973-74, seems to have spawned a sense of despair. Against this dis- 
couraging record, the apparent economic success of Brazil in recent years 
under a regime of "monetary correction"-a  policy of widely applied in- 
dexing-is  patently appealing: inflation rates have  been  reduced from 
about 90 percent in 1964 to some 15 percent in calendar year 1973; and 
the real growth rate has averaged more than 7 percent per capita annually 
from 1968 to  1973. Few countries would not opt for indexing if it could 
guarantee those results. There is a certain irony that the Brazilian experi- 
ence should serve as the basis for the policy prescription: for years, mis- 
sions from the International Monetary Fund to developing nations urged 
the conventional wisdom of orthodox monetary and fiscal policies to extir- 
pate inflation; the sermon some now preach is that developed countries 
ought to adapt to price rises rather than to try harder to eliminate them. 
Before that conclusion is too readily accepted, the recent Brazilian ex- 
perience with monetary correction merits closer scrutiny.3 The logic  of 
post hoc, propter hoc is never especially compelling, and this occasion is 
no exception. I have several reservations about Brazilian indexing. First, 
far from relying on automatic correction to general price movements, it 
has been characterized  by significant modifications designed to accommo- 
date to  policy  objectives. More  generally, the reduction of  inflation in 
Brazil owes little to indexing, but a great deal both to direct governmental 
intervention and to successful monetary and fiscal policy. Second, mone- 
tary correction, as applied, not only did not correct inequities generated 
by rapid price rises, but in fact reinforced them. Finally, the undeniably 
positive effects of indexing upon Brazilian growth seem to flow from two 
features of the indexing experience that are largely irrelevant  to the United 
States: the effect of the crawling peg of the Brazilian foreign exchange rate 
on exports and the creation of significant nonbank financial intermedia- 
tion. 
In this paper, I will first detail the types of monetary correction per- 
mitted in Brazil and the circumstances of their introduction. The second 
section examines the consequences of monetary correction for the reduc- 
tion of inflation, the efficiency of resource allocation, and the equality of 
3. Unfortunately,  the accounts  of the system  that have been widely disseminated  are 
partial, or factually incorrect, or both. Even prestigious  journals fail; the Economist 
article  of April 27, 1974  (pp. 82-83), while better  than most, is not exempt.  I have relied 
here on Julian  Chacel,  Mario Henrique  Simonsen,  and Arnaldo  Wald, Correcao  Mone- 
tario (Rio de Janeiro:  APEC, 1970),  for earlier  aspects of the system, updating  its fea- 
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income distribution in Brazil. And the third explores the applicability to 
the United States of the Brazilian experience. 
Types of Monetary Correction 
An exact exposition of Brazilian monetary correction as practiced since 
1964 would be quite complicated, for it has involved probably more than 
a hundred laws and implementing  decrees. The underlying  principles, fortu- 
nately, are simpler: nominal values such as bond principals, savings ac- 
counts, mortgage payments, rentals, the exchange rate, and fixed physical 
assets are adjusted to corresponding real magnitudes by formulas employ- 
ing recent inflation rates; and wage increases are based upon average real 
wages prevailing over the previous twenty-four months  plus prospective 
increases in productivity and prices. The measure of  inflation used for 
adjustment  is a general  wholesale price index in all instances except rentals, 
where the standard is the minimum wage.4 
These two types of correction were designed to serve quite different  ends. 
Nonwage adjustments, in general, were intended to restore relative prices 
as a guide to the allocation of resources. The continuous acceleration of 
inflation in the five years preceding the military takeover in 1964 had made 
reliance on relative prices precarious at best; some types of markets-for 
long-term securities, for example-simply  did not exist. Contracts among 
individuals could legally be indexed, and some were. But banks were not 
eager to insist upon the practice: they made their profits from the spread 
between interest rates paid to depositors and received from borrowers, and 
the spread widened with greater inflation even though both real rates be- 
came negative. With borrowers obviously against it, and savers for it, no 
ready conjunction of interests encouraged extension of monetary correc- 
tion in the private sector by itself. Governmental intervention was required 
and came to pass in 1964 as part of the effort that the new government 
made to restore the market calculus. 
4. The wholesale price index used in Brazil includes only commodities, although 
services  account for more than half of income originating.  Weights  in principle  corre- 
spond approximately  to value added in producing  sectors, but closer examination  re- 
veals obvious inconsistencies.  Metal products constitute 15 percent of the weight of 
industrial  products  in the index, about the same as processed  foods; yet the latter were 
about twice as important  in industrial  value added  in the base year. 
So long as inflation  is high, the choice of the index  is relatively  unimportant.  As rates 
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The formal system of indexing had its specific origin in mid-1964 when 
three- to five-year  readjustable  government bonds were first issued to help 
finance the still large federal deficit. The principal of the debt was subject 
to full revaluation on a quarterly  basis; the indicated real interest rate was 
applied to this revised value. At the same time, balances owed to the gov- 
ernment for taxes or social security contributions were put on a real basis. 
Subsequently, income tax brackets were regularly redefined. 
In the same year mortgage loans were indexed, and a national housing 
bank and related private institutions were created. Resources were to be 
drawn at first mostly from compulsory contributions of the social security 
system, as well as from indexed savings accounts and securities; residential 
construction was to be the chief beneficiary. The aim was to expand the 
supply of long-term mortgage funds, which rapid inflation had so curtailed 
that virtually the only remaining source had been public funds allocated 
from social security receipts. These funds were inadequate at best and had 
to be rationed to restrict excess demand; furthermore, they, too,  suffered 
erosion in real value and had to be supplemented by current governmental 
proceeds to satisfy the required outflow of social security payments them- 
selves. 
Indexing was also applied to  time deposits of commercial banks and 
newly established investment banks, in an effort to make private saving 
considerably more attractive. Not  all liabilities were treated in this way, 
however. Commercial acceptances, the principal nonmonetary asset both 
at that time and today, carried no such adjustment because of their short 
duration-typically,  180 days. Nominal, fixed, interest rates prevailed for 
this instrument, but with an incidental advantage (later altered) that for 
tax purposes the profit could be calculated in real terms ex post. On the 
asset side, short-term loans dominate, even for investment banks. Here, 
nominal principal repayment and correspondingly higher interest rates are 
the rule; indeed, one of the principal failures of monetary policy in recent 
years has been the inability to reduce these rates despite deceleration of 
inflation. 
Beyond  the  far-reaching modifications  for  banks  and  the  mortgage 
market, the privilege of regular revaluation was extended to  two  other 
areas in the early years of the new government. One was the rental market; 
another, the private productive sector. For both,  some adjustments had 
been applied, albeit irregularly and incompletely, as early as the  1950s. 
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they  neither adequately corresponded to  inflation nor  were made  fre- 
quently enough. The annual adjustment  cycle adopted in 1964, which linked 
rents to  the minimum wage, corrected these deficiencies. Moreover, be- 
cause rents had been frozen in the early 1960s-partly  as a populist gesture, 
partly as an anti-inflationary stratagem-the  initial corrections substan- 
tially exceeded those subsequently allowed by the formula. 
For the productive sector, the principal problem was the exaggeration 
of nominal profits by the failure to account for the erosive effect inflation 
had  on  replacement allowances. The pressing concern was the right to 
revalue capital assets from initial historical cost. Although revaluation for 
some purposes was first  permitted  in 1951, and was made automatic in 1958 
under the impetus of an excess profits tax, it was still not satisfactory to the 
firms. The appreciation  in asset values arising from inflation was itself sub- 
ject to tax, and more important, could not serve as a basis for calculating 
depreciation for computing taxable profits. Its only purpose was to reduce 
liability under the excess profits tax,  which could  be,  and was,  simply 
evaded.5 Even during the raging 80 percent inflation in 1963, the revalua- 
tion  of total corporate capital amounted to  only 27 percent; but in the 
twelve-month period October 1964 through September 1965, with lesser 
inflation but new tax laws, the revaluation of capital values was 137 percent 
of initial capital costs.6 The dramatic change can be traced directly to in- 
tervening  legislation that facilitated  (indeed, forced) revaluation. The tax on 
rising asset values resulting from inflation was reduced and could be paid 
in installments; and it was even possible to purchase nontransferable re- 
adjustable  treasury  bonds (in double the amount of the tax liability) in lieu 
of paying taxes. At the same time the penalties were mitigated the advan- 
tages were enhanced: for the first time depreciation could be calculated on 
the basis of the revalued  capital stock. This last provision was implemented 
in stages to avoid too sudden a loss in tax revenues. 
In the same basic legislation, revaluation of working capital was also 
recognized as a legitimate expense. Initially, out  of  pragmatic concern 
with receipts, relief was limited to liabilities under the excess profits tax. 
5. Excess profits  taxes  yielded  on average  about 4 percent  of total income  tax receipts 
despite  high and accelerating  inflation  in the early 1960s.  The underlying  data are avail- 
able in the Anuario  Estatistico  for indicated  years. 
6.  Conjuntura  Economica  (February and November 1965), as  cited in  Keith S. 
Rosenn, "Adaptations  of the Brazilian  Income  Tax to Inflation,"  Stanford  Law Review, 
Vol.  21  (November 1968), p.  82.  Other useful information on  legal  aspects  of 
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Only at the very end of  1968 was the privilege extended to  regular in- 
come tax liability. Adjustment of working capital was of particular im- 
portance in Brazil because last in-first out (LIFO) inventory accounting 
was not legal. (This method automatically eliminates taxation of nominal 
profits associated with inflation-induced  capital gains and largely obviates 
the need for legislative correction.) 
A final, and quite significant, nonwage distortion was also dealt with in 
1968 through the establishment of regular mini-devaluations of the Bra- 
zilian cruzeiro on foreign exchange markets. Obviously, under the infla- 
tionary conditions that had beset Brazil, fixed exchange rates were an 
economic impossibility. A fluctuating exchange rate for imports had been 
established in the mid-1950s but finally gave way in 1961, partially under 
external pressure, to a more conventional fixed rate that then was subject 
to discrete changes. The disadvantages of the fixed rate were clear: large 
devaluations after a period of cumulative inflation meant significant cost 
increases internally; exports, meanwhile, were discouraged by  the high 
variance in real receipts; and speculation against the cruzeiro in anticipa- 
tion of devaluation ultimately could necessitate depreciation,  thereby  vindi- 
cating the expectations (and validating the profits). The reasons for resis- 
tance to abandoning the fixed rate were equally clear: adoption of a system 
of mini-devaluations before inflation had stabilized could easily have fed 
inflationary  expectations and spurred  price increases for productive inputs. 
Not  until the rate of price increase had been brought down to about 25 
percent could attention profitably be turned to  the allocation question. 
Then Brazil followed the lead of Chile and Colombia, both of which had 
adopted a crawling peg for their currencies. The difference in Brazil was 
that comprehensive and generous export subsidies were simultaneously 
granted, and expansion of exports was given high priority by the govern- 
ment. 
These measures were mainly directed toward greater allocational effi- 
ciency; the  exception was monetary correction for  government bonds, 
which was undertaken to ensure noninflationary deficit financing. In wage 
policy, however, the clear intent was to fight inflation. Under a new and 
ingenious scheme to dampen wage adjustments, the target was the average 
real wage over the preceding twenty-four months rather than restoration 
of the peak real wage at the time of the last nominal increase.7 Because 
7. Initially,  in 1965,  the wage formula  was applied  to federal  employees  and workers 
subject  to the minimum  wage; it was extended  to wage disputes  in the private  sector  in Albert  Fishlow  267 
inflation had been accelerating, progressively eroding average real wages, 
this device immediately reduced the required nominal increase. Secondly, 
projected rather than experienced  inflation (and productivity) was the cri- 
terion. The retardation of price rises that was the goal of governmental 
policy could be anticipated in current wage settlements. If inflation in fact 
slowed on schedule, smaller nominal wage gains would nonetheless trans- 
late into real income stability. With an increment to reflect productivity 
increases, which was added in 1966, such a wage plan could, in principle, 
reduce inflationary wage pressures while augmenting real earnings. 
In algebraic terms the formula for nominal wages is 
n+l  =.5(Wn  +  WVn_)(l +  rn+,)(I  +  0.5ine+1)Pn 
where 
Wn+1  =  the nominal wage to apply in the next twelve months 
Wn1  =  the real wage prevailing in the past year 
r =  the rate of anticipated productivity increase 
i  =  the rate of expected inflation 
Pn  =  the price index at the end of period n. 
In practice, real wages did decline despite the use of this wage formula. 
Because the central components of the formula were expectations rather 
than realizations, wage correction was in fact not indexed at all. Nominal 
wage increases could be  granted in any magnitude deemed convenient, 
simply by assuming the appropriate  rate of future inflation. Following con- 
siderable shrinkage in real wages, an element of automaticity was intro- 
duced in  1968 to compensate for the systematic understatement of price 
rises that had characterized  wage policy for the previous three years. The 
new formula was 
Wn+ =0.5  [jn  (I + 8.)  +  Wn_1]  (1 +  rn+?)(l + 0.5ine1)p 
where in is the actual rate of inflation realized in the most recent period of 
wage setting. This formula restated the base for the new wage calculation 
as the real wage that would have prevailed had price expectations been 
1966. Individual  enterprises  and workers  could agree on other terms, which explains 
why average  wages might (and did) rise more rapidly than indicated by the formula. 
There  are also small discrepancies  between  the formula  and the minimum  wage actually 
announced.  Military  wages  were  not bound  by the formula  and in fact rose more  rapidly 
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realized. In the absence of an accurate estimate of future inflation, it did 
not assure  the stability of real wages during the period between wage settle- 
ments; but in fact, more realistic projections were made and real wages 
ended their steep descent. 
Even with the move to the new formula, no correction was made for the 
previous shortfall; nor has any allowance been made since 1968 for errors 
in forecasts of the increase in productivity. Although initially the deliberate 
understatement of price increases dominated the real wage settlement, as 
these increases were more accurately assessed, the productivity term as- 
sumed greater  significance, especially under the conditions of rapid growth 
that  Brazil experienced after  1968. Under  the  formula  real wages  in- 
evitably  rose  less  than  productivity because  the  previous  twenty-four 
months rather than a single year was used for the real wage base; more 
important, the gain in output per worker was in fact systematically and 
continuously understated. 
In practice, then, Brazilian wage policy has proven virtually completely 
discretionary.  And, indeed, so has most of the rest of the system of mone- 
tary correction. Obvious pragmatism  frequently  led to delays in application 
of monetary correction, as the prospective efficiencies in allocation were 
weighed against the immediate  loss of governmental  revenues  and increased 
cost pressures. In addition, tax privileges, other dimensions of the cost of 
credit, and the very correction factors themselves constantly were manipu- 
lated to achieve particular ends. Indexing was an element of intervention 
and as such, was substituted for other policies. 
For  example, monetary correction as  applied to  mortgage loans  has 
undergone extensive revision. Instead of true readjustment by the price 
index, mortgage payments were linked to the minimum wage. Changes in 
real interest rates also were arbitrarily  introduced to reduce loan payments; 
and these changes were accompanied by correspondingly smaller credits 
to the pension funds that provided most of the mortgage funds. In 1973 
the government raised the income taxes to be withheld on profits from 
acceptances, while maintaining them at minimal levels for profits on fed- 
eral debt, housing bonds, and savings deposits. Furthermore, it has now 
ruled that only formal monetary correction is subject to deduction from 
taxes, and that securities  with initial nominal rates no longer qualify. Both 
of these measures significantly affect the profitability of acceptances com- 
pared to  alternative assets; tax legislation has thus imposed differential 
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Finally, readjustments  made in recent years no longer compensate fully 
for changes in the price level. The real yield on 4 percent one-year govern- 
ment bonds in 1973 was 1.6 percent; or to put it another way, monetary 
correction in 1973 in fact brought about an adjustment of only 12.8 percent 
against a price rise of 15.5 percent.8  The cruzeiro was not devalued during 
1973 despite this rate of price increase. Past rules for continuing devalua- 
tion  were not followed in the face of improvements in the current and 
capital accounts of the balance of payments and of the record, and unde- 
sired, level of reserve accumulation. 
Considering the fact that high rates of inflation were offset at least in 
part, departures  from full compensation are of secondary importance. At 
lower rates of inflation, however, the extent of discretionary authority and 
market intervention loom much larger. So does the choice of index itself: 
one issue in Brazil is whether services should be excluded when more than 
half of income originates in this sector. Dissatisfaction with the rates of 
monetary correction implied by the wholesale price index forced an ex- 
tensive reformulation of the index in 1969. 
The point, then, is that adoption of indexing in Brazil has not estab- 
lished once and for all a rule that obviates governmental influence in allo- 
cation of resources or distribution of income. To assert that it had done 
so would do an injustice to the ingenuity and innovativeness of Brazilian 
policy makers. Nor  would it accurately convey the credit owed to  con- 
scious intervention in the economy for the miracle of rapid growth and 
diminishing inflation. This conclusion will become clearer in the following 
sections, which examine in more detail the contributions of indexing to 
the Brazilian achievement. 
Effects of Monetary Correction 
Proponents of indexing stress its favorable effect on  the volume and 
allocation of financial saving, and its protection of fixed-income recipients. 
But indexing is also advocated as an aid in reducing inflation that can 
operate through several channels: the government can draw on voluntary 
saving rather than central bank credit to finance the deficit; expectations 
can be manipulated  by reducing  the difference  between instruments  bearing 
8. For yields and price index changes,  see Banco Central  do Brasil,  Relatorio  Anual, 
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real rates of return and those with nominal rates; and higher real interest 
rates can restrain investment, and hence reduce aggregate demand.9 
Whatever the theoretical possibilities, and despite some observations to 
the contrary, indexing had little or no influence in reducing Brazilian in- 
flation.10  On this point, even the staunchest Brazilian advocates of mone- 
tary correction are unanimous; here is a sample, from the current Minister 
of Finance: 
With  respect  to inflation,  it is known  that monetary  correction,  because  of its 
neutralization  of inflationary  distortions,  is also a feedback  factor  to the rate of 
price  increase.  It is true  that correction  permitted  substantial  sale of Readjustable 
(Treasury)  Bonds  to the public,  thus serving  to dampen  inflation  on the side of 
demand.  On the other  hand, it is probable  that the extent  of feedback  has been 
appreciably  enhanced  by the large-scale  application  of monetary  correction." 
In fact, only in 1966 were sales of governmental securities large enough to 
permit the government to engage simultaneously in deficit financing and 
monetary restraint. In  1964 the issue was negligible; in  1965 sales were 
more than offset by the surplus on the international trade current account, 
and the corresponding addition to high-powered money; and by 1967 sales 
to the public were less than the (corrected) interest and redemption out- 
payments. In more recent years government financing has depended most 
heavily on short-term treasury bills, sold at discount without correction; 
these have permitted the monetary authorities to neutralize the effects on 
the money supply of the accumulation of some $6 billion in international 
reserves from 1968 to  1973. 
The principal effect of indexing in its initial years was to introduce posi- 
tive real interest rates for savers, and a fortiori for borrowers. These higher 
9. For a summary  discussion  of the presumed  consequences  of indexing,  see OECD, 
Indexation. 
10. See, for example, Milton Friedman: "With it, they have been able to reduce 
inflation gradually  from about 30 per cent in 1967 to about 15 per cent now without 
inhibiting  rapid  growth,  and they may be able to succeed  in gradually  bringing  inflation 
down to near zero." Newsweek,  Vol. 83 (January  21, 1974),  p. 80; and OECD, Indexa- 
tion: "This system  of complete  monetary  correction  appears  to have been instrumental 
in enabling  the Brazilian  authorities  to reduce  drastically  the country's  rate of inflation 
without  hampering  its economic growth"  (p. 34). 
In fact a better  explanation  for Brazilian  success  is afforded  by the gradual  reduction 
in fiscal  deficits,  chronicled  in Table 1, along with increasing  imports  and price  and wage 
controls. The high rate of growth, by providing  large productivity  dividends,  has also 
been a highly significant  factor. 
11. Mario  Henrique  Simonsen,  Inflacaio:  Gradualismo  vs. Tratemento  de Choque  (Rio 
de Janeiro:  APEC, 1970),  p. 191. The translation  is mine. Albert Fishlow  271 
Table 1. Instruments  and Objectives  of Stabilization Policy, Brazil, 1963-73 
Federal  Annual  percentage  change 
govern- 
ment  Implicit 
deficit  Annual  price 
(percent  nominal  Bank  Real  index  for 
of gross  interest  credit  to  Real  gross  gross 
domestic  rate"  Money  private  min2imum domestic  domestic 
Year  product)  (percent)  supplyb  sectorb  wagec  product  prodluct 
1963  4.2  78.4  64.3  55.1  -8.8  1.5  78.0 
1964  3.2  83.0  84.6  80.3  -0.1  2.9  87.8 
1965  1.6  80.2  76.5  57.5  -6.1  2.7  55.4 
1966  1.1  78.0  15.8  33.6  -7.3  5.1  38.8 
1967  1.7  59.9  43.1  55.8  -3.7  4.8  27.1 
1968  1.2  55.7  42.5  64.8  1.0  9.3  27.8 
1969  0.6  57.4  32.6  43.2  -3.9  9.0  22.3 
1970  0.4  54.3  26.7  34.4  -0.8  9.5  19.8 
1971  0.2  54.3  31.3  45.5  -0.9  11.3  20.4 
1972  0.2  49.0  33.5  45.1  2.8  10.4  17.0 
1973  -0.1  44.4  46.8  45.4  3.8  11.4  16.5d 
Sources: Relevant issues of Conjuntura  Economica, and Supplement; Boletim do Banco Central  do Brasil 
Anudario  Estatistico; and Banco Central do Brasil, Relat6rio Anlual,  1972 (1973). 
a.  Monthly acceptance rate to borrowers, compounded for twelve periods; 1964 and 1963 are extrapo- 
lated from the rate paid to lenders. 
b. December-to-December  change. 
c.  Deflated by cost of living index, and inclusive of salary bonuses. Wages in Guanabara were used as 
the base. 
d. Change in wholesale price index (the corresponding change in the wholesale price index from 1971 
to 1972 was 18.5 percent). 
costs contributed to rising prices; and, because nonbank sources of credit 
responded only minimally and bank credit was curtailed, they provoked 
two recessions in Brazil, in mid-1965 and in the last quarter of 1966. The 
first was moderated by a partially accidental monetary expansion that was 
based on the trade flows; the second, by a significant change in economic 
policy that helped spark economic growth.12 
Table 1 compiles some of the relevant statistical dimensions of the in- 
struments and goals of stabilization policy. Between 1964 and 1967, the 
government succeeded in curbing the cash deficit and slowing the rate of 
increase of wages; in 1966 it applied severe monetary restraint. As a result, 
inflation was reduced to half its 1963 rate and growth in real per capita 
product, although modest, was at least positive. Yet the annual data on 
both indicators conceal the true state of the economy in March 1967 when 
12. For a more elaborate  account of post-1964  attempts  to cope with inflation, see 
my essay,  "Some  Reflections  on Post-1964  Brazilian  Economic  Policy,"  in Alfred  Stepan 
(ed.), Authoritariani  Brazil:  Origins, Policies,  anid  Future (Yale University  Press, 1973). 272  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
the new government took power. The economy was deep in recession and 
the annual inflation rate of 32 percent experienced in the first quarter was 
threatening  to accelerate. 
In the face of such circumstances, orthodox economists, and the IMF, 
called for renewed  restraint  and continued patience, while those who made 
Brazilian  economic policy before 1967 pointed to the light at the end of the 
tunnel if only the faith were kept. The new government, more mindful of 
the mounting internal complaints in the three years since the military coup, 
failed to accept the external advice. Instead, they increased the deficit; ex- 
panded the supply of money and, in particular, credit to the private sector 
more rapidly; and, even in the absence of greater  productivity gains, scaled 
minimum wage adjustments  more closely to the cost of living index. Efforts 
to reduce nominal interest rates were also begun, by lowering real interest 
rates on governmental securities and by direct pressure from the monetary 
authorities on commercial banks and acceptance companies. While these ef- 
forts  were  only  partially rewarded (the  margin for  intermediation re- 
mained inordinately high), the greater availability of  credit, which was 
perhaps more  important  than  its  price,  was  sufficient to  underwrite 
continuing expansion. In any event, the government was careful to allow 
sufficient inflation to validate the high nominal rates. 
These new policies succeeded admirably and helped to set the stage for 
the very high levels of real income growth in recent years. They succeeded 
because by  1967 the Brazilian economy was not  subject either to excess 
aggregate demand or to permissive wage settlements. In fact, considerable 
excess capacity existed in the industrial sector, and as Table 1 shows, real 
wages had been continually reduced after 1964. Once the deficit had been 
brought under control by  1965, tighter reins on money demand in  1966 
restrained output, but not prices, in the industrial sector. A highly concen- 
trated market structure,  and important economies of scale in the branches 
of industry established during the previous surge of import substitution, 
explains the resistance. Under the spur of two sharp recessions, price be- 
havior altered, as the decline in inflation after 1964 testifies; but the trade- 
off between price stability and real output growth was not  particularly 
favorable, nor did it seem to be becoming more so. The new government 
chose to accept inflation in the pursuit of faster output growth. 
This second phase of the Brazilian experience, covering the seven years 
1967-73, has seen only gradual further slowing of inflation, more modest 
than that achieved in the 1964-67 period. The bias in favor of growth was Albert Fishlow  273 
clear. Monetary correction was extended to the foreign exchange rate in 
1968. In addition, indexing became a more flexible instrument, but with 
the unvarying intent of restraining,  rather than encouraging, higher real 
interest rates. In this respect Brazilian policy differed significantly from 
say, anti-inflationary  strategy in Korea, where high interest rates were ex- 
tended to demand deposits as a means of encouraging larger balances. In 
Brazil, monetary holdings were absorbed in increasing quantities less by 
virtue of price effects than as a consequence of the need to finance renewed 
growth. 
Direct governmental intervention to limit industrial prices was another 
important part of this second phase. A new agency to review requests for 
price increases was established in the Finance Ministry in 1968, and took 
its responsibilities seriously. Requests for price increases had to be sub- 
mitted to it, and the minister himself participated in the most important 
and delicate cases. Price increases had to be justified by proven cost in- 
creases, with allowance made for offsetting productivity gains. These con- 
trols were far sterner  than those applied-not  unsuccessfully-in  1965: the 
earlier measures had been viewed as a temporary expedient at best; more- 
over, compliance was voluntary, elicited by  fiscal incentives and more 
generous availability of credit. 
In short, after 1967, the emphasis shifted to  more expansionary, and 
more pragmatic, policies. Earlier, concern had centered not only on infla- 
tion, but also-and  even more-on  restoring the role of the market. That 
is why monetary correction was tolerated from its very inception despite 
its possibly negative contribution to the battle against inflation. Indexing 
and the rapid readjustment of prices in previously controlled areas like 
rents, public utilities, and favored imports, were ideological commitments, 
and not merely technical decisions. The perceived task was to reorder the 
system, and orthodox policies were used partly as a punitive device to help 
along this reordering so that such policies themselves could work more 
effectively. 
Although monetary correction was thus established early on, its allo- 
cative consequences were largely postponed until economic recovery got 
well under way. What mattered initially was not saving, but expenditure. 
The post-1967 Brazilian strategy rested on the excess industrial capacity 
persisting from an earlier  cycle, which had been inspired  by import substitu- 
tion and had peaked in the early 1960s. Among the activities leading the 
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especially in 1967 and 1968, and the latter beginning in 1968. Strikingly, 
while both sectors are tied firmly to  financial intermediation, monetary 
correction was of direct significance for neither. Acceptances were always 
quoted in nominal terms, and it was their high yield and short duration 
that attracted investors. Mortgages were obviously  of  longer term, but 
until the end of 1973 the obligatory social security deposits were the domi- 
nant source of mortgage financing, as Table 2 demonstrates. As far as the 
short term is concerned, therefore, indexing was not a significant factor in 
the Brazilian upturn. 
Over the longer term, particularly  as saving and investment requirements 
increased more rapidly than gross product, indexing deserves more credit. 
Table 2 clearly indicates an impressive and continuing increase in non- 
monetary financial assets from the late  1960s on. Not  all of the growth 
corresponded to augmented private saving, however. First, some substitu- 
tion for other financial assets, including money, came about in response to 
interest rate differentials. Second, some saving that previously had been 
directly invested was channeled through intermediaries; the  earlier ab- 
sence of a mortgage market had resulted in high downpayments and short 
maturities. Third, there is quite possibly some double counting of assets 
held within financial institutions. Furthermore, a heavy proportion of the 
financial assets were simply channeled into purchases of consumer dura- 
bles. Acceptances, the instrument used for this purpose, account for more 
than a third of the assets. 
The effect of indexing on aggregate  saving is therefore  difficult  to quantify. 
It is certain that the public sector has also been a major factor in supplying 
required resources, through the surpluses of government enterprises, con- 
trols over current outlays, and creation of  obligatory contributory pro- 
grams. But whatever the effect on saving may have been, intensified inter- 
mediation was a significant factor by itself. While credit might have been 
expensive, it could at least be predictably obtained. There can be little 
doubt that an organized capital market did much to dispel the uncertainty 
and inefficiencies of previous years. 
Monetary correction thus provided a  framework within which rapid 
growth could more easily generate the resources required to sustain itself. 
The vision that seemed so remote in 1965 when indexing was established for 
financial assets has been partly-but  not entirely-fulfilled.  The expected 
long-term capital market, in which investment banks would figure promi- 
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than two years for working capital. Monetary correction has not  been 
enough. Partly to compensate for this deficiency, and to  reduce interest 
rates, foreign loans were increasingly sought after 1970. With interest rates 
in the Eurodollar market quite low at the time, the supply was especially 
responsive. But because the embarrassment of riches complicated short- 
term monetary management, such dependence was actively discouraged in 
the second half of  1973. Lately, in the face of soaring petroleum prices, 
foreign loans have been welcomed again. Yet the problem of finance for 
long-term private investment remains. Efforts are currently being made to 
introduce debentures, convertible and fixed, as a means of encouraging the 
supply of longer-term capital. Fiscal incentives have been abundantly be- 
stowed; whether they will be as successful in inducing the desired response 
as past measures on the short side of the market have been, remains to 
be seen. 
A second clear success for indexing has been in the foreign trade sector, 
where exports have grown at an average annual rate of 27 percent since 
1968. While the expansion of manufactured exports has been especially 
publicized, nontraditional agricultural products have  figured almost  as 
impressively, aided, to be sure, by rising international prices, but without 
benefit of the extensive export subsidies granted to manufactures.13  Under 
the impulse of the crawling peg, and with rising import capacity, the econ- 
omy has increased its openness quite significantly in recent years. Because 
of this transformation the Brazilian  economy is much better able to absorb 
the shock of higher petroleum prices than most other developing countries. 
Indexing might have been expected to improve income distribution, as 
it  provided more  favorable opportunities to  those  least  able to  hedge 
against inflation. In fact, however, the results of monetary correction, as 
it was applied in purposive fashion against wages, seem to have been quite 
regressive by any standard. In the first phase of inflationary control, real 
minimum wages declined by some 16 percent, although average  industrial 
real wages did rise by perhaps 7 percent  between 1964  and 1967. Thereafter, 
while the former continued relatively constant, and the latter increased, 
average real wages rose considerably less than productivity gains. Average 
13. Exports of industrial  products  (narrow  definition)  increased  from $130 million 
in 1968 to approximately  $1 billion in 1973, and thus from 1 percent  of exports  to 16 
percent.  Nontraditional  agricultural  exports  have expanded  from about $400 million to 
more than $2.5 billion in the same period. (These calculations  are based upon initial 
estimates  of 1973  exports  in Conjuntura  Ecoiomica, February  1974.) Albert  Fishlow  277 
real wages in the urban sector, as measured by the Ministry of Labor and 
deflated by the cost of living, increased by only 12 percent between April 
1967 and April 1971, compared with productivity gains more than twice as 
great. In the industrial sector average annual wages deflated by industrial 
prices rose more rapidly-19  percent between 1967 and 1971-but  com- 
pared with an increase in product per worker of at least 32 percent, the re- 
ward hardly seems generous. Only in 1972 did it seem that wages paralleled 
productivity advances; in 1973, they modestly exceeded them. Under these 
circumstances, the functional distribution of income altered in favor of 
capital, and studies in the size distribution indicate a parallel move in favor 
of higher incomes, as might be expected. This the government has finally 
conceded.14 
There is still reluctance, however, to  grant that economic  policy has 
played a part in this process. The wage policy, in particular, is praised for 
its elimination of disputes and its guarantee of industrial peace. Yet, what- 
ever the conceptual merits of the original formula as a device for curbing 
wage demands equitably and in a self-justifying  fashion, its application was 
hardly undertaken in this spirit. The economic rationalization was prior 
excesses of labor: "The first sin of past laborism was the obsessive pre- 
occupation with massively high salaries. These were far beyond the pro- 
ductivity and growth increment possible  from production. The  natural 
result of this illusion was acceleration of the inflationary process."15 A 
more careful analysis of the wage-price spiral fails to support such a claim: 
real minimum wage costs, including all social security supplements, de- 
clined by 13 percent between 1957-60 and 1962-63 and should have pro- 
vided a margin for greater price restraint, particularly since there was a 
concomitant increase in productivity of some  15 percent. But control of 
wages by the newly installed military government also served a political 
function. The urban working classes were a principal source of support 
for the emerging populist regime that had just been toppled. 
Nor can the association of education with income gains exonerate the 
deliberate decisions of policy makers. It is tautological to presume that, 
because the incomes of the university-educated increased by 52 percent 
14. For discussion  of this and other  issues  concerning  the state and change  of income 
distribution  in Brazil, see my recent "Brazilian  Income Size Distribution-Another 
Look" (1973; processed). 
15. Roberto Campos, the first Minister of Planning, as quoted in Octavio Ianni, 
Crisis  in Brazil (Columbia  University  Press, 1970),  p. 189. 278  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
while those of illiterates  remained  constant during the sixties, markets were 
validating  merited skill differentials.  In fact one can show that such returns 
imply implausible shift factors for relative demand or, in other words, that 
relative  incomes were not merely the reflection of marginal productivities.16 
At the bottom of the income spectrum, firms took advantage of govern- 
mental fiat and the absence of employee organizations to restrict  wage pay- 
ments. At the upper extreme, payments for administrators and other sala- 
ried employees were probably closely linked to  the higher profits being 
earned, and jobs  were created to  absorb the greater supply of educated 
workers. 
These distributive aspects of the Brazilian miracle are no less real than 
the trade and capital market statistics. Nor are they less closely related to 
the system of monetary correction. In the first phase of post-1964 policy, 
"owing to the underestimate  of continuing inflation, . . . [the wage formula] 
seems to have provoked a certain decline of real wages between 1965 and 
1967, which was after all the counterpart of the relative improvement that 
was intended to be guaranteed to renters of property, to concessionaires 
supplying public utility services, to the bearers of fixed-income securities, 
and to the rest of the beneficiaries of corrective inflation."1'7  Thereafter, 
underestimated productivity gains were absorbed by others in analogous 
fashion, while monetary correction could  be manipulated as needed to 
reduce the real rate of return on pension contributions from 5 to 3 percent, 
while maintaining high real returns and tax advantages for purchasers of 
acceptances. 
Lessons for the United States? 
The debate about indexing in the United States obviously will not be 
resolved by analysis of the Brazilian experience. The merits of indexing in 
the totally different U.S.  context must be judged by what it promises to 
deliver here. It is germane, however, that the instances of its most striking 
success in Brazil are quite inapplicable to the American economy. 
In Brazil and other Latin American countries, where rates of inflation 
had reached levels of 40 and 50 percent and beyond, monetary correction 
16. "Brazilian  Income Size Distribution-Another Look," pp. 13-16. 
17. Simonsen,  Inflacao,  p. 184 (my translation). Corrective  inflation refers to the 
once-for-all  readjustment  of rents, utility rates,  and so on, as undertaken  after 1964. Albert Fishlow  279 
was a valuable-indeed,  a necessary-device  to restore interest rates and 
exchange rates to some meaningful allocative function. Here in the United 
States, although double-digit inflation rates are threatening, the capital 
market does not seem to be seriously malfunctioning. Interest rates have 
adapted to price increases, and while their adaptation does not match the 
full extent of current inflation, that itself may be a measure of the wisdom 
of the market. There is no persuasive reason why current inflation should 
be built into future expectations on an exactly proportional basis.  Nor 
should low real interest rates be interpreted  without regard for the unsatis- 
factory current earnings prospects in the productive sector. 
On the international scene, an automatic crawling peg does not seem to 
be an adequate solution to the problems posed by the passing of the old 
system of fixed exchange rates. Better a flexible rate entirely than an auto- 
matic adjustment tied to an arbitrary  and ill-measured set of comparative 
price indices. Operating under flexible rates, the market can take account 
of capital flows and of trade performance-which  is not merely a price 
phenomenon-in  the determination of the rate. Even the Brazilians were 
forced to concede as much in 1973 when they at least temporarily aban- 
doned automaticity in favor of administrative discretion. For the United 
States, moreover, a policy of presumed guaranteed competitiveness hardly 
seems the most effective route to greater international cooperation; for a 
country at the margins of the trading system, the opportunities are clearly 
greater. 
Ultimately, the Brazilian experience offers two lessons. The first is that 
at very high rates of inflation, a country must resort to policies that restore 
some semblance of rational allocative guidance. For such purposes, and 
particularly  if the market is to be relied upon, widespread indexing may be 
highly effective. But an equally valid conclusion is that indexing is not a 
neutral and mechanical instrument. Even if it were not manipulated di- 
rectly, as it  was in Brazil, widespread monetary correction by  its very 
character is not a substitute for governmental intervention, but a means 
of  it.  The  following examples are illustrative. Revaluation  of  assets is 
equivalent to more accelerated depreciation for tax purposes; allowance 
for depletion of working capital is a differential levy on capital gains on 
inventory; and automatic adjustment of the limits of income tax brackets 
is equivalent to altering marginal tax rates. 
The net effect of such policies is to reduce the "automatic" stabilization 
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of  maintaining a  presumed allocative neutrality. But that  neutrality is 
surely ambiguous in a world in which marginal tax rates, capital gains 
taxes, and depreciation schedules are regularly altered to achieve certain 
objectives. Moreover, by perfecting the propagation of exogenous infla- 
tionary shocks, indexing exacerbates the need to use other discretionary 
instruments.'8  The resort to price controls by Brazil is a good example. At 
relatively low rates of inflation, there is something to be said for not com- 
pounding the burdens upon conventional policies by making them compen- 
sate for monetary correction too. 
This is not to deny the potential benefits of issuing indexed securities, 
or of removing legal barriers to private arrangements incorporating such 
correction. Such assets might well be useful. Policy makers could thereby 
respond efficiently to  varying expectations of inflation among investors, 
and by such discrimination, reduce nominal interest rates. A case can also 
be made for guaranteed partial compensation for past price increases as a 
way of bringing greater order to wage negotiations. But even with the best 
of intentions, widespread  correction for inflation cannot resolve conflicting 
distributional claims in a totally impartial fashion. One characteristic of 
recent American inflation is the transfer of real income abroad. Indexing 
does not do away with the market and political power of special interests 
to  avert such losses and convert them into  gains. Indeed, the Brazilian 
experience, by its very caricature of that proposition, makes that point 
forcefully. 
Discussion 
WILLIAM  POOLE  AND  OTHERS commented on the difficulty of formulat- 
ing an acceptable indexing plan. Poole cited the unsuccessful experience 
of the Israeli government in the early 1950s in indexing the national debt. 
18. The Finnish  experience  is revealing  on this point. After devaluation  in 1967, "the 
rise in import prices and export incomes . . . threatened  to lead, through  the network 
of index linkages,  to  an inflationary  spiral  . .  ." (OECD,  Indexation, pp.  35-36).  The 
system was thereupon  canceled in 1968. In Brazil, as has been frequently  noted, the 
government  has been ready  to modify indexing  when it has conflicted  with other objec- 
tives. Currently,  as inflation  threatens  a resurgence-prices rose more  in the first  quarter 
in 1974  than in the first  half of 1973-one  can anticipate  much more direct  intervention 
and much less monetary  correction. Albert  Fishlow  281 
First the exchange rate and then the consumer price index was used as a 
basis for indexing, but neither proved widely acceptable. The government 
manipulated the exchange rate and controversy arose over the construction 
of the CPI and whether consumer prices should be subsidized to  avoid 
higher interest payments on the debt. Poole felt that similar controversies 
would be inevitable in the United States and cited labor's opposition to 
recently proposed changes in the CPI as an indication of the volatility 
of this issue. Joseph Pechman added that indexing circumvented the basic 
issue  of  getting business and labor to  exercise restraint so  as  to  help 
moderate inflation. An indexing formula designed to slow inflation would 
be as unpalatable to organized labor as wage and price controls. 
The redistributional  aspects of indexing received considerable attention. 
Robert J. Gordon noted that indexing was an attractive device for spread- 
ing the inflationary  burden which, he asserted, is now borne primarily by 
small  asset  holders.  However,  others  questioned  whether the  gainers 
and losers from inflation can be identified easily. And Fishlow emphasized 
that any redistribution  associated with indexing would have to be deliber- 
ate rather than automatic. Specifying the redistributional scheme was a 
terribly difficult  task and one that, in the Brazilian case, led to regressivity 
in the name of increased allocative efficiency. Marina Whitman noted that 
the recent U.S. inflation had largely benefited foreigners  and U.S. farmers; 
no particular  indexing system could have entirely prevented this pattern of 
redistribution. In her opinion, the most significant argument for indexing 
was that it could remove distortions of  decision making that otherwise 
might be caused by rapid inflation. 
Arthur Okun expressed concern that indexing would unleash a spiral of 
inflationary pressures.  He suggested that unlimited indexing would simply 
transmit destabilizing shocks to the price level while partial indexing in- 
volved a tradeoff between relief from past price increases and the agony 
of  continued inflation. However, Gordon and William Nordhaus  ques- 
tioned whether a fast pass-through of an inflationary shock, such as an 
increase in oil prices, would be worse than the lagged and variable pass- 
through that  many models  predict in  the  absence  of  indexing.  Okun 
replied that what was needed were more impediments to the transmission 
of  inflation so  that shocks did not  escalate fully throughout the wage- 
price structure of the economy. 
John Kareken queried  why indexing had not developed more extensively 
in private markets. Poole noted that some forms of indexing-on  FHA 282  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
mortgages, for instance-were  expressly prohibited. Fishlow observed that 
some financial institutions in California indexed mortgages in a limited 
form; however, offering widespread indexing as  a  means of  attracting 
deposits was prohibited. Okun suggested that inflation-oriented policies- 
such as the LIFO accounting system or escalator clauses in wage settle- 
ments-were  remarkably uncommon because people  wanted to  believe 
in the validity of the dollar as a yardstick for transactions and accounting. 